Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme by Walsh, Catherine Meier
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 11
January 1976
Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential
Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning
Scheme
Catherine Meier Walsh
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Catherine Meier Walsh, Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme, 11 Urb. L.
Ann. 223 (1976)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/8
ALTERNATIVES TO WARTH v. SELDIN:
THE POTENTIAL RESIDENT CHALLENGER OF AN
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING SCHEME
CATHERINE MEIER WALSH*
Local governments are vested with zoning powers to design com-
prehensive land use plans which will serve the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the community.' The exercise of this power results in a
division of the municipality into districts with differing restrictions or
exclusions on the use of each district's land. By excluding certain
buildings, structures, and uses of land, local governments not only
achieve their goal of insuring compatible growth and development
within the area, but may also exclude certain classes of people from the
area.
2
Exclusionary zoning is the use of otherwise legitimate land use
practices to deny low-income and minority persons access to the
suburban housing market. Exclusion may be accomplished through a
variety of zoning techniques that limit the number of multi-family
dwellings, prohibit mobile homes, and set minimum building,
bedroom and lot-size requirements.3 The primary effect of such zoning
*B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973; J.D., Washington University,
1976.
I. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
2. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.13 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
ANDERSON].
3. Six major exclusionary devices and their effects are as follows: (1) Minimum building-
size requirements - directly influence housing costs. (2) Single-family restrictions -
effectively preclude the influx of those who cannot afford a home of their own because the
most promising opportunity for good inexpensive housing is to be found in some form of
multiple dwellings. (3) Restrictions on the number of bedrooms - the number of
bedrooms is often restricted when multiple dwellings are permitted. The most frequent
provision requires that 80% of the dwellings have only one bedroom, permits two
bedrooms in 20% of the units, and permits no units with more than two bedrooms. Clearly,
dwellings subject to such restrictions do not provide the type of housing needed by most
families. (4) Prohibition of mobile homes- may discourage the in-migration of innercity
residents who cannot afford more expensive housing. (5) Frontage and lot-width
requirements - street paving, sewers, curbs and storm controls require wide lots and are
often too costly for moderate income families. (6) Lot size requirements - large lots not
only increase costs but may curtail the availability of land for multi-family dwellings. See
Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New
Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 475, 481-84 (1971). See also Brooks, Exclusionary Zoning,
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practices is to raise the price of land and ultimately the cost of dwelling
units within the municipality. The secondary and often the intended
effect is the exclusion of persons from lower socio-economic groups who
cannot afford to pay the price of access.'
Those excluded from the suburb's housing, education, social and
economic resources are the prime victims of restrictive zoning practices. 5
Nevertheless, this class of potential residents has traditionally been
denied standing to attack such ordinances because the standing
requirements in zoning litigation have been strictly interpreted by the
courts. 6 Traditionally, only those with a property interest in land subject
to the ordinance have been afforded standing. Thus, under the
traditional view a potential resident, because he is not a landowner, is
said to lack the necessary "personal stake" in the dispute.7 This
Planning Advisory Report No. 254, at 3 (American Society of Planning Officials, Chicago,
Ill., 1970), cited in Lauber, Recent Cases in Exclusionary Zoning, in I MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL OF GROWTH 465, 474 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
4. See Moskowitz, Standing of Future Residents in Exclusionary Zoning Cases, 6 AKRON
L. REv. 189, 190 (1973). Due to the disproportionately high number of black and Spanish-
speaking Americans in the lower-income groups, economic segregation is usually
accompanied by racial segregation as well. See generally Aloi, Recent Developments in
Exclusionary Zoning: The Second Generation Cases and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L.
REV. 88 (1974); Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The
Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and
Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1969 U. ToL. L. REv. 65;
Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land-Use Controls, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and
Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971).
5. One commentator has stated, "Such practices contribute directly to the inferior
education lower-income children receive by confining them to what are generally
conceded to be inferior and economically segregated inner-city schools." Lauber, supra
note 3, at 465. Also, potential residents excluded by suburban zoning schemes are denied
better employment opportunities as more and more industrial establishments move to
outlying suburbs. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of jobs in central cities decreased
from 12 to 11 million, while jobs in the suburbs increased from seven to ten million. The
number of reverse commuters increased by 72.7% in the last decade to 1.46 million, even
though transit schedules continued to favorincoming rather than outgoing commuters in
peak hours. Many workers are forced to make a choice: either commute as much as five
hours per day at a cost of as much as fifteen dollars per week to a job in the suburbs or do
without work at all. See Lauber, supra note 3, at 465-66.
6. See generally 3 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 21.06.
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962). A potential resident is afforded standing only if
he joins in an action with a present resident or developer who does have a property interest.
See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968); Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp.
396 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788
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restrictive interpretation of the standing requirements in zoning
litigation was reaffirmed in 1975 by the United States Supreme Court. In
Warth v. Seldin8 the Supreme Court held that potential residents, city
taxpayers, developers and homebuilders' associations do not have
standing to challenge the validity of the exclusionary zoning practices
when none of the plaintiffs either own land or propose to build on a
particular site within the suburb.9•
Warth is an ominous precedent for potential resident challengers of
exclusionary schemes.' 0 Nevertheless, an examination of state and
federal case law both prior and subsequent to Warth indicates a slight
but growing liberalization of the standing requirements in zoning
litigation. In future litigation, a potential resident's likelihood of
success in reaching the merits of his challenge" will depend upon: (1)
whether the exclusionary impact of the ordinance is racial or economic;
(2) whether there are statutory as well as constitutional grounds for the
challenge; or (3) whether the state courts have recognized a cause of
action broad enough to protect a potential resident's interests. This Note
will examine these alternatives and outline the cause of action or claim
that a potential resident must plead in order to be granted standing. To
accomplish this goal it is first necessary to analyze the general
prerequisites of standing to sue in zoning litigation and scrutinize the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Warth.
(5th Cir. 1972); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1970), aff'd, 425 F.2d
1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
8. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (5-4 decision).
9. Id. at 502-08.
10. Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, summed up the apparent import of the
majority opinion in these words:
Thus, the portrait which emerges ... is one of total, purposeful, intransigent
exclusion of certain classes of people from the town, pursuant to a conscious scheme
never deviated from.... Yet the Court turns the very success of the allegedly
unconstitutional scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation. In effect,
the Court tells the low-income minority and building company plaintiffs that they
will not be permitted to prove what they have alleged - that they could and would
build and live in the town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its
application - because they have not succeeded in breaching before the suit was filed,
the very barriers which are the subject of the suit.
Id. at 523.
11. When the court denies standing it often acts with some knowledge of the merits of the
claim and with the view that the claimant does not deserve relief. See Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Association of Data Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in
Land-Use Disputes: Some Notes from a Dark Continent, 55 I.L. REv. 344,348-52 (1969);
cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 503 (1965).
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I. THE PREREQUISITES FOR STANDING TO SUE IN ZONING LITIGATION
Often the most difficult hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome in zoning
litigation is the threshold issue of standing. t2 Only "persons aggrieved"
by the zoning ordinance are allowed to challenge its constitutionality in
the state court.13 The "persons aggrieved" standard has also been used to
determine who may participate in 4 or seek judicial review of' 5 admin-
istrative proceedings for special permits, variances or exceptions to the
zoning ordinance. 16 Because of legislative failure to define who is a
"person aggrieved," the term has been judicially defined.' 7 To fit within
the court's definition of an aggrieved person the plaintiff must be
"specifically, personally, and adversely affected by the administrative
decision."' 18 The majority of state courts have interpreted this language
to require that the plaintiff have a legal or equitable interest in the
property affected by the zoning decision.19 Therefore, only landowners
or developers submitting a specific housing application or petitioning
for a zoning variance are granted standing by the state courts. 20
12. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 21.05.
13. Constitutional challenges are a major weapon for plaintiffs in zoning litigation. The
device most often used to test the validity of a zoning ordinance or planning scheme is the
declaratory judgment. The majority of these challenges are brought in state court alleging
violations of state constitutions because the complaint fails to allege a substantive federal
question. See 1 id. § 2.01; 3 id. §§ 16.09, 24.01, 24.03. See also note 24 infra.
14. The first step for obtaining special permits, variances or exceptions is the filing of a
petition before a board of adjustments (or board of appeals). The board of adjustments has
original jurisdiction to consider applications for special permits and exceptions, plus
whatever additional original jurisdiction is delegated to it by the municipality under
applicable state law. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 2, §§ 16.02, 16.03, 16.05, 16.11; 2 A.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 4C-1 (1972).
15. In turn, proceedings to review the decision of the board of adjustment may be taken
to a state court at the instance of"a person or personsjointly or severally aggrieved" by this
decision. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 21.02.
16. The courts have assumed that the indicia of a "person aggrieved" by an
administrative zoning decision are the same as those that determine whether a person has
sufficient grounds to raise a constitutional claim. Id. § 16.11. But see Note, Extending
Standing to Nonresidents: A Response to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmenta-
tion, 24 VAND. L. REv. 341, 345 (1971).
17. See Note, Standing to Appeal Zoning Determinations: "The Aggrieved Person
Requirement," 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1070, 1072 (1966); Comment, "The Aggrieved Person"
Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 294 (1967).
18. Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents, supra note 16, at 355.
19. Id.; 3 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 16.11.
20. Nonlandowners and developers without specific site plans have generally been
denied standing by the state courts. See, e.g., City of Greenbelt v. Jaegar, 237 Md. 456, 206
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Nonresidents of the municipality are generally held to lack sufficient
legal or equitable title in local land to challenge the validity of the
regulations. 2t In a growing minority of jurisdictions, however, the
definition of"person aggrieved" has been somewhat relaxed to include a
select group of nonresidents who own land adjoining the disputed area.
Under the rationale utilized by these courts, standing is granted because
the nonresidents' property is considered to be sufficiently affected by
regulations on the neighboring property. 22 Following this trend toward
liberalization, one state legislature has gone so far as to recognize that
any person residing "within or without the municipality" has standing
to attack a zoning ordinance. 23
Plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning practices in federal court2 4
A.2d 694 (1965); Wood v. Freeman, 43 Misc. 2d 616,251 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd,
24 App. Div. 2d 704, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965); Commonwealth v. County of Bucks, 8 Pa.
Commw. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973).
21. See note 17 supra. See also Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New
Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1054 (1972).
22. One of the first state cases to announce the right of a nonresident to challenge a
neighboring zoning ordinance was Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J.
238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). In Cresskill residents of a neighboring municipality challenged a
Dumont zoning amendment on the ground that it "fail[ed] to take into consideration the
physical, economic and social conditions prevailing throughout the entire area.., and
the use to which the land in the region can and may be put most advantageously.., in
utter disregard of the contiguous residential areas of the plaintiff boroughs." Id. at 240, 104
A.2d at 412. The court did not deal directly with the standing issue because two plaintiffs
owned property in the affected area and this was considered sufficient to sustain the action.
The importance of the case lies in the fact that the court established that a municipality's
zoning responsibility does not halt at its boundary lines and that a municipality "owes a
duty to hear any resident and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may be adversely
affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much consideration to their rights" as
they would their own residents and taxpayers. Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445-46 (emphasis
added). Cresskzll can thus be read to expand the group of challengers to include those
neighboring property owners injured by a municipality's zoning laws. See also Foran v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 158 Conn. 331, 260 A.2d 609 (1969); Pattison v. Corby, 226 Md. 97,
172 A.2d 490 (1961); Allen v. Coffell, 488 S.W.2d671 (Mo. 1972); Daly v. Eagan, 77 Misc. 2d
279 353 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501
P.2d 591 (1972).
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp. 1975); see note 135 and accompanying text infra.
24. To bring suit in federal court the plaintiff must, of course, first satisfy jurisdictional
prerequisites. The Constitution provides that federal courts will be given jurisdiction over
cases "arising under" the Constitution and laws of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2.28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (1970), gives district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and arises under federal law. A number of
statutes grant jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy in many areas that
fall under the general "federal question" jurisdiction. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970), gives original jurisdiction to district courts in all civil rights litigation without the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount.
Federal challenges to exclusionary ordinances are often brought against the city and its
1976]
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under either the Constitution or a federal statute must satisfy similar
standing requirements. 25 A "case or controversy ' '26 and an "adversary
conflict" 27  involving neither a "political question" 28  nor a
"hypothetical set of facts" 29 are required. In Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp3 O the Supreme Court
reevaluated the law of standings' and announced a broad two-pronged
test:32 the plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged action has caused
him "injury in fact," and (2) that the interest he seeks to protect is
arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by
councilmen who have implemented the zoning regulations. These suits often seek relief
under the fourteenth amendment and the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970).
Several courts have held that a city official is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 and
that a federal court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), overan action to enjoin
him from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute. See Construction Indus. Ass'n
v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96S. Ct. 1148 (1976); Ybarra v.
City of the Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1974). At other times a
challenger will seek review of actions taken by a federal agency in charge of the location
and site plan for a public housing project. See notes 101-15 and accompanying text infra.
Often, however, a potential resident challenger lacks any type of substantive federal
question and must thus rely solely on available state relief.
25. See generally Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning
Decisions: Restricted Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 598 (1971). Federal courts have generally required that the challenging
party hold a. property interest. In some instances, however, adjoining landowners and
adjoining municipalities have also been afforded standing to challenge an ordinance
affecting their property. For example, in River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684
(2d Cir. 1968), a New Jersey township was afforded standing to challenge a New York
township's rezoning of adjoining land from one acre residential to office park. The New
Jersey township alleged that the rezoning would result in a reduction in its revenues as a
result of a depreciation in property values and at the same time require additional
expenditures to cope with increased traffic. Id. at 685. The court found such allegations to
be "a sufficiently direct injury to give the township standing." Id. at 687. This holding
indicates that standing in a zoning controversy in federal court should not be restricted
only to persons whose property is located within the municipality which enacted the
ordinance in question.
26. U.S. CONsr art. III, § 2.
27. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The courts seek assurance that "questions
[will] be framed with the necessary specificity to assure that constitutional challenges
[will] be made in a form capable of judicial resolution." Id. at 106.
28. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
30. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Data Processing and a companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 (1970), were decided the same day.
31. For discussions of the federal law prior to Data Processing see K. DAVIs,
ADMINIsrRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 22.04 (1958); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645, 648-58 (1973).
32. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
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the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.3 3
The "injury in fact" requirement has enjoyed considerable flexibili-
ty.34 Racial, economic, aesthetic and even environmental injuries35 have
sufficed. The party seeking to redress such injuries, however, must
himself specifically be harmed, and the injury, although slight, must
still be real and direct, and not hypothetical or conjectural.3 6 For the
33. Although Data Processing was an interpretation of the "person aggrieved" language
in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), courts have since construed its
holding broadly, applying it generally to all cases where standing of the parties isat issue.
The Data Processing test has been applied in several recent exclusionary zoning cases. See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing denied to low-income inner city residents
seeking to move out to the suburbs because they had "no injury in fact"); Construction
Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148
(1976) (standing granted to individual builders, homebuilders association and landowners
challenging city's "population cap" because they had "injury in fact"); Park View
Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F 2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972) (standing granted to
development corporation and potential residents challenging total exclusion of multi-
family dwellings because they had social, economic and racial "injury in fact").
3 1. See Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 256, 260 (1971). The "injury in fact" test (1) insures that the traditional requirements
of a "case or controversy" have been satisfied, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and (2) insures that
the parties have the necessary "personal stake" in the outcome and that the issues are
presented with "concrete adverseness." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
35. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669. 689 n.14 (1973); note 43 infra.
36. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). As a general rule, courts will allow
organizations to assert the interests of their members in a small number of "special
circumstances" which particularly favor organizational standing. An organization must
have statutory authorization to serve as representative of its members orregularly represent
its members at administrative hearings. These "special circumstances" are often available
to organizations in civil rights litigation. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,459-60 (1958). Additionally, an organization will have
the right to represent its members only where it can show a special on-going relationship
between itself and those whose rights are allegedly violated. In that event it must plead
individualized harm to itself or its members. For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972), the Supreme Court denied standing to an environmental group claiming a1special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of the national parks, game
refuges, and forests of the country" for asserting no individualized harm to itself or its
members. Id. at 730. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights. Organization, 96 S. Ct
1917 (1976). An analysis of prior exclusionary zoning decisons uncovers awillingness
to grant housing organizations standing where a property interest or )proposed
building site is also involved. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), one of the first public housing cases to explore standing,
plaintiffs included two nonprofit tenants' organizations consisting of low-income blacks
and Puerto Ricans. The court granted the association standing because it had a personal
stake in the outcome and was asserting a protectible right. In Sisters of Providence v. City
of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971), three nonprofit housing organizations were
1976]
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latter reason, federal courts, when interpreting the "injury in fact"
requirements in exclusionary zoning cases require that the aggrieved
party have an ownership interest or other interest in the land.3 7 This
position is consistent with the state courts' definition of "person
aggrieved.""8
The second prong of the Data Processing test, the "zone of interests"
requirement, is a "protective intent analysis" which often turns on the
nature and the source of the claim asserted. 9 Using the "zone of
interests" test in a proceeding under a federal statute the standing
question becomes whether the statutory provisions, which are based on
congressionally created rights, can properly be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.40 Since the
"zone of interests" may reflect "aesthetic, conservation and recreational,
as well as economic values,"4 courts in exclusionary zoning cases could
constitutionally expand the protections accorded to potential
residents.4 But despite the Supreme Court's recent liberalization of the
standing requirements in other fields, it has recently espoused a more
allowed to sue on behalf of their members who would be denied housing if the property
were not rezoned. The court stated that "this alone would be sufficient for standing." Id. at
401. The court indicated that the nonprofit associations had a stake in the outcome of the
controversy because they had expended time and effort in their attempts to encourage low-
and moderate-income housing in the area. Finally, in Park View Heights Corp. v. City of
Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972), the court held that two associations sponsoring a
housing development had standing to question whether the purpose and effect of an
exclusionary ordinance was to exclude low- and moderate-income individuals from a
suburb of St. Louis. The court stated that standing would be granted "where the interests
of the party asserting the right and the party in whose favor the right directly exists is
sufficiently close." Id. at 1214. In Black Jack the developers and potential residents had
identical interests: to overturn the discriminatory zoning that blocked the construction of
multi-racial federally subsidized housing. The Black Jack court relied heavily on Brewer v.
Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956), which established the "sufficient
closeness of interests" test for determining whether one has standing to assert another's
interests.
37. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); note 43 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 13-23 supra.
39. See Scott, supra note 31, at 663.
40. The Warth Court noted early in its opinion that "the actual or threatened injury
required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing." 422 U.S. at 500, citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
41. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 15-1
(1970).
42. Evans v. Lynn P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 113,712 (2d Cir.June2, 1975)
see notes 91-116 and accompanying text infra.
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restrained view in zoning litigation.4 3
II. Warth v. Seldin: A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE
STANDING REQUIREMENTS IN ZONING LITIGATION
In 1975 the task of applying the new standing test to the exclusionary
zoning context first came before the Supreme Court. In H'arth v.
Seldin 4 potential residents of Penfield, New York, challenged as
exclusionary the town's zoning ordinance under which ninety percent of
the land was zoned for single-family detached housing.4 5 This ordinance
also fixed lot sizes, floor areas, lot widths and setbacks for dwellings.
Only three-tenths of one percent of the vacant land was available for
multi-family structures. Where the ordinance did permit multi-family
low-income housing, it limited density to twelve units per acre, limited
the portion of the lot which could be occupied by the dwellings, and
required a minimum number of garage and unenclosed parking
facilities for each unit.4 6 Plaintiffs were potential residents of Penfield:
low- and moderate-income blacks and Puerto Rican residents of
Rochester, 47 and persons working in Penfield who could not afford to
-13. In contrast to the federal courts' more restrained use of standing in zoning litigation,
standing to Nuc has been freely construed by the courts in the suits concerning the
environment (United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973)), tax (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)), competition
(Asociation of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)), and
administrative law (Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)). For example, in SCRAP the
Suprcme Court afforded standing to environmental groups seeking an injunction against
an I.C.C. freight rate increase. Plaintiffs (SCRAP) alleged that the rate increase would have
an adverse impact on the human environment. SCRAP claimed that each of its members
suffered direct economic, recreational and aesthetic harm as a result of the adverse
c-n ironmental effect of the railroad rate structure. The Court found specific, although not
significant, "injury in fact," declaring that "we have allowed important interests to be
%indicated b plaintiffs with no more at stake than a fraction of a vote." 412 U.S. at 689
n.l 1. See generally, DAvIS, supra note 31; Moskowitz, supra note 4; Note, Extending
-Standing to Nonresidents, supra note 16; Comment, Standing to Challenge Ad-
lninstralwe ctions. 23 VAND. L. REv. 814, 817 (1976).
1 . 122 U.S. 490 (1975).
45. See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 2910 app. D, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975).
46. Id. at 5.
17. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' practices and policies of excluding low-income
per-ons and members of minority groups resulted in a denial of the "right to raise their
children in an integrated environment and obtain the benefits of the improved housing
conditions and community services of Penfield." Id. at 9.
19761
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live there. 48 Also joined as plaintiffs were Rochester taxpayers,4 9 two
nonprofit associations concerned with low-income housing,50 and the
Rochester Homebuilders Association, Inc.51 None of the plaintiffs had a
48. Plaintiff commuters asserted economic injury due to the burdensome commuting
expenses they incurred each year. Id. at 7-8.
49. Warth suggests city taxpayers will no longer be able to challenge a suburban zoning
scheme. In Warth taxpayers from the adjoining suburb of Rochester claimed that they
were suffering economic injury through increased taxes. They argued that Penfield's
zoning practices forced them to provide more tax-abated low and moderate-cost housing
than would otherwise have been required. The Supreme Court found the line of causation
between Penfield's alleged exclusionary actions and injury suffered by Rochester
taxpayers to be both remote and attenuated. Indeed, the Court went so far as to declare their
pleadings "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable." 422 U.S. at 508-10. The
Supreme Court failed even to mention the federal taxpayer standing cases which the lower
court made such great efforts to distinguish. See 495 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (2d Cir. 1975). In
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), plaintiff was afforded standing on the basis of his status
as a federal taxpayer, based on his allegation of a violation of a specific congressional
spending limitation. The plaintiff taxpayers' claims in Warth did not attack a spending
measure of Congress, and thus the Supreme Court apparently felt the case was not in point.
In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), standing was afforded to a local taxpayer.
The direct and immediate interest protected in that case was that of a "taxpayer of a
municipality in the application of its monies." Id. at 486. The taxpayers in Warth were not
"'of the municipality" which they were suing; norwere they attacking an"application" of
that municipality's monies. See also Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (Court
required a direct injury to the taxpayer of the local government as a prerequisite for
taxpayer standing). No suggestion is made even by the Warth dissenters, that the taxpayers
should have been afforded the opportunity to assert their claims in court. Certainly this is
an appropriate reading of the taxpayer standing cases. But see Aloi, Recent Developments
in Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 4, at 142-46.
50. The Housing Council claimed that standing should be conferred because one of its
members, Penfield Better Homes, had been denied approval of a specific housing project
in 1969. The Court admitted that in 1969 the Housing Council would have been entitled to
standing. Absent a viable project site in 1972, however, the Housing Council had no
present right to represent Penfield Better Homes. 422 U.S. at 516-17. Justice Brennan,
dissenting, advocated opening the door to allegations of past injury (which members of
these organizations clearly made) and to future intent to develop suitable housing in
Penfield: "past experiences, if proven at trial, will give credibility and substance to the
claim of interest in future building activity in Penfield." Id. at 530.
Metro-Act of Rochester unsuccessfully claimed an interest in the litigation on several
grounds. First, it claimed a "special interest" in housing. The Court rejected this
contention applying the rationale of Sierra Club that "public interest" alone was an
insufficient basis for standing. Secondly, Metro-Act's claim of standing as a taxpayer of
Rochester failed because the alleged injury was too remote and attenuated. Thirdly, Metro
Act's claim of standing as representative of individual appellants seeking housing in
Penfield failed because the individuals had no standing. Fourthly, Metro Act claimed
standing because one of its members was Director of Penfield Better Homes. This claim
was found without merit, however, because Better Homes itself was denied standing.
Finally, the Court refused to afford Metro Act standing to assert the claims of its members
living in Penfield. Id. at 510-14. For a discussion of standing for organizations see note 36
supra.
51. Rochester Homebuilders Association was a builder's trade association that
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legal or equitable property interest within Penfield. The Supreme
Court, affirming the decisions below,52 found that the allegations of
social and economic injury, absent a proposed building site, were
insufficient to give plaintiffs standing to attack the ordinance; that a
plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged
practices harmed him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible
way from the court's intervention.53
The Warth Court dealt specifically with the "injury in fact" portion
of the Data Processing test. The Court refused to follow the lead of the
Eighth Circuit which had recognized the "economic" injury suffered by
potential residents excluded by a suburban zoning ordinance. 54 Instead,
the Court determined that for a nonresident plaintiff to meet the "injury
in fact" portion of the Data Processing test he will be required to allege
some direct relationship to a "specific project site." 55 This result
conflicts with a line of cases in which physical, economic and social
injuries" similar to those present in Warth57 had been found sufficient
attempted to intervene as plaintiff. In doing so Homebuilders sought to represent its
members who it claimed had been denied the opportunity to build low-income housing in
Penfield. Permission to intervene as a party plaintiff was denied because of a failure to
show the existence of any direct, immediate or present harm to its members. 422 U.S. at
514-16.
52. Id., aff'g 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 507-08.
54. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Blackjack,467 F.2d 1208, 1212-14(8th Cir. 1972);
see notes 59-66 and accompanying text infra.
55. 422 U.S. at 507-08 & n.18. In the majority's opinion, absent any present pr6posal fora
building site, alleged injury in fact is legally insufficient. Without a direct and immediate
injury to itself or its members, an association, even under the most liberal rules of standing
law, will not be entitled to judicial review of the merits of its dispute. See Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
56. justice Brennan recognized this "injur " in his dissent where he argues that "it is
abundantly clear that the harm alleged s'tisfied the 'injury in fact,' economic or
otherwise." 422 U.S. at 525 (citing Data Proc .sing). See Comment, Standing to Challenge
Exclusionary Local Zoning Decisions, supra note 25, at 618 & n.80; Comment, The
"'Aggrieved Person" Requirement, supra note 17, at 304; cf. Sager, supra note 4, at 785. But
see Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 4, at 88, 104-11.
57. For example, plaintiff Ortiz was a Spanish-American who was dissatisfied with
rearing his children in the decaying inner-city section of Rochester. Accordingly, in 1968,
he began searching for a home in one of the surrounding suburban towns. He attempted to
rent or buy a home in Penfield where until 1972 he had been employed. But because no
multi-racial, low- or moderate-income housing units were available, petitionerwas forced
to reside in Wayland, New York, 42 miles from Penfield. Travel one way to his job in
Penfield took at least one hour and ten minutes; in bad weather, about two hours. The cost
of gasoline alone, commuting to and from his job, was approximately $666.00 per year. 422
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to give potential residents standing.5 A good illustration of the trend
that had been emerging prior to Warth is Park View Heights Corp. v.
City of Black Jack.59 The Black Jack court, one of the first to apply the
Data Processing test in the zoning area, implied that "economic" injury
in fact would suffice to meet the first prong of the new standing test.60
In Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit dealt almost exclusively with the
standing of parties61 to litigate the validity of an ordinance which
effectively prohibited construction of multi-racial, federally subsidized
moderate- and low-income housing in a St. Louis suburb.62 Plaintiff
U.S. at 503 nn.13 & 14.
The injury to the Warth plaintiffs was not limited to burdensome commuting problems
and costs. Plaintiffs sought housing in Penfield, but were excluded because of their income
level. The inner-city environment in which they resided was characterized by dilapidated,
substandard housing, violence and insufficient community services. Since defendants'
zoning scheme resulted in the exclusion of low-income persons and members of minority
groups, plaintiffs alleged they were being denied their rights to rear their children in an
integrated environment and obtain the benefits of the improved housing conditions and
community services in Penfield. See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 7-9, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
58. The dissent points out "that the harms claimed [by the potential residents]... are
obviously more palpable and concrete than those held sufficient to sustain standing in
other [federal] cases." 422 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Park View Heights
Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1216 n.10 (8th Cir. 1972). Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit in Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga.
1971), approved injuries similar to those alleged by the plaintiffs in Warth. Individual
plaintiffs in Crow contended "that they [were] being denied access to [low-rent] public
housing outside of the racially impacted areas of Fulton County because of the actions of
the County officials [due to arbitrary action and thoughtless inaction of the County]." The
court rejected the suggestion that the parties lacked the requisite injury. Accord, Shannon
v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970) (held sufficient an allegation that the
concentration of low-income residents in a low-income project would adversely affect not
only investments in homes and businesses, but the quality of their daily lives). The Warth
Court distinguished these cases on the basis that they each involved a particular project
under construction, thus easing plaintiffs' burden of showing the causal connection
between defendants' action and plaintiffs' injury. 422 U.S. at 507-08 & nn.17-18. This
single factor should not be determinative of whether plaintiffs are actually suffering
injury. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 16- 18, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490(1975); Aloi,
Recent Developments. in Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 4, at 137 (suggesting that there
is some support for a grant of standing in the absence of a specific project site based on the
notion of discriminatory effects of a facially neutral zoning scheme).
59. 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
60. Id. at 1214, 1216 8c n.10.
61. Plaintiffs were: (1) Park View Heights Corp., which was formed by two churches to
sponsor the housing development, and held exclusive title to the land, (2) Inter-Religious
Center for Urban Affairs, Inc. (ICUA), which had advanced substantial "seed money" for
initial development of the project, and (3) eight individual residents of the City of St. Louis
who wanted to move to the county. None could afford county housing, though they would
have qualified for the proposed Park View Heights apartments. Id. at 1210 & n.2.
62. Id. at 1210.
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Park View Heights Corporation sought to sponsor such housing in St.
Louis County in order to improve the economic, educational and
recreational environment available to moderate- and low-income
tenants.6 Plaintiff Inter-Religious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc.
(ICUA), a development corporation, signed a sales contract to buy land
in an unincorporated area of the county and subsequently transferred its
rights under the contract to the Park View Heights Corporation. Soon
after the initial application for housing subsidies to the federal
government was made, area residents began active opposition to the
proposed location. This opposition culminated in the incorporation of
the city of Blackjack and passage of a zoning ordinance that prohibited
multi-family dwelling units in the city. The district court held that only
Park View Heights Corporation, the owner of the site, had standing to
challenge the ordinance. 64 On appeal, all plaintiffs were found to have
standing to challenge the ordinance. The Eighth Circuit held that
ICUA's advancement of "seed money" and the time and energy
expended in planning and developing the project gave it a "personal
stake" in the outcome sufficient for standing to litigate its claim. The
court further held that ICUA and Park View's "economic interests"
satisfied the "injury in fact" test: "It is as important to protect the right
of sponsors and developers to be free from unconstitutional interferences
in planning, developing and building an integrated housing project, as
it is to protect the rights of potential tenants of such projects. ' 65 More
importantly, the court also found that Park View and the individual
plaintiffs as potential residents could assert their alleged economic and
social injuries:
The statistics cited by the plaintiffs indicate a great need to provide
low and moderate income housing in the suburban area, a need
which Park View and ICUA are trying to fill. Any attempt to
interfere with this program may work a visible and immediate
hardship on the class of low and moderate income citizens of the
City of St. Louis. 66
63. Id.
64. 335 F. Supp. 899, 902 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
65. 467 F.2d at 1212.
66. Id. at 1216 n.10. The court, having recognized that the individual plaintiffs had
standing to attack the ordinance, id. at 1214, determined further that "the hardship to the
parties of withholding judicial consideration... compels an immediate resolution of this
controversy." Id. at 1216.
While the language of Black Jack would appear encouraging to potential residents, the
case in fact does little to assure the availability of a federal forum to vindicate an excluded
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The Warth Court, however, did not accept the Eighth Circuit's views
of "economic" injury in fact. The Court was not convinced that the out-
of-the-pocket losses and denial of specifically enumerated services in
Penfield were the immediate and direct result of defendants' ex-
clusionary actions. 67 The Warth Court chose instead to determine
"injury in fact" by focusing initially on whether there was a particular
project site. The absence of a particular project site in Warth became a
prima facie indicator of no "injury in fact," and in the Court's view,
provided the essential fact distinguishing Warth from Black Jack and
prior cases in which potential residents, who hadjoined with project site
owners, had been granted standing.68 In adopting the project/no project
distinction as its indicator of injury in fact, the Court was able to
reconcile Warth with prior decisions striking down exclusionary
schemes, 69 and at the same time deny standing to the potential residents
of Penfield.
The question that remains after Warth is the real value of the thin
project/no project line separating those plaintiffs with from those
without standing. The fact that a particular project is under
construction might ease plaintiffs' burden of showing the causal
connection between defendants' actions and plaintiffs' injuries. But it is
clearly arguable that this test is not determinative of whether plaintiffs
are actually suffering injury.7 0 A comparison of the complaints in Warth
to those in earlier cases, including Black Jack, shows that the injury to
potential residents in the "no project" case is just as severe as the
hardship experienced where a project is underway. 7' The Supreme
Court, however, appears to have spoken definitively on this point. In
Warth there was no project and no standing for potential residents. In
Black Jack there was a project and standing for both the developers and
potential residents to assert their interests. Without a project then the
result seems clear no standing for anyone. Therefore, the potential
resident's claim for equal housing opportunity. In view of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971), and San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), it
appears that equal housing opportunity remains a nonprotectible "economic matter"
which is not subject to strict constitutional scrutiny as are the "suspect" classifications of
race, religion and nationality.
67. But see 422 U.S. at 524-25 & nn.3-4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. See note 58 supra.
69. 422 U.S. at 508 & n.18.
70. See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, at 18, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
71. See note 58 supra. See generally Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning,
supra note 4, at 136-39, 146-53.
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resident must either find a way to satisfy the project/no project test or
find a means to circumvent the Warth result.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO Warth v. Seldin
A. The Potential Racial Impact of an Exclusionary Ordinance
The potential resident seeking a means to circumvent the Warth
Court's requirement of a "particular project site" to demonstrate
"injury in fact" should consider whether the complaint in that case was
faulty in failing to allege purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination.7 2
Had the Warth plaintiffs been able to prove that they had suffered direct
racial discrimination as a result of the Penfield ordinances, the Court
might have allowed plaintiffs' standing based on a violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
Prior case law suggests that courts are aware that many exclusionary
ordinances evince a purpose or effect to discriminate on racial grounds.73
In such cases plaintiffs have been successful in invoking the fourteenth
amendment and the civil rights acts74 to strike down ordinances as
72. The Court noted, "As we read the complaint, petitioners have not alleged that
respondents 'refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,.... or national origin.' "422 U.S. at
513 n.21. Justice Powell indicated that the Supreme Court treated plaintiff's complaint as
one alleging wealth discrimination. In its statement of the case, the Court described
plaintiffs' claim as one in which"the town's zoning ordinance, by its terms and as enforced
by the defendant[s] ... effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income." Id. at
493. Further, the Court characterized the minority status of some plaintiffs as
"coincidental." Id. at 502. In fact, the Warth complaint failed to allege the minority status
of some plaintiffs in the case. The Court's refusal to find that the complaint alleged
"purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination" is an affirmation of its view that the
deprivation of constitutional rights by reason of race was not in issue. Id. at 513 n.21.
73. Compare the notable absence of statistical data indicating racial discrimination in
Warth with Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975). While not expressly involving the
standing issue, Arlington Heights aptly illustrates the federal courts' continuing
sensitivity to racial discrimination in zoning law. In Arlington Heights aChicago suburb
refused to rezone church-owned land from single-family to multi-family for a housing
project. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted the plaintiffs' argument
that the refusal to rezone had a racially discriminatory effect and perpetuated the
segregated character of Arlington Heights in contravention of the fourteenth amendment.
After examining demographical statistics, the court concluded that no other suitable site
for such housing was available and that the unjustified exclusion of the project would
preclude the possible increase in the black population of the village. (27 out of 64,884
people in the village were blacks.) See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization
v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d291 (9th Cir. 1970). But see Ybarra v. City of theTown of Los
Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970).
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exclusionary. Curiously, no specific test for standing was discussed in
most of those cases; the courts simply granted standing in "bold" or
"visceral" statements.7 5
Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston,76
illustrates judicial sensitivity to the racial impact of certain exclusionary
techniques and the reluctance of some courts to deny standing to those
injured by such practices. Plaintiffs77 in Sisters of Providence claimed
that the denial of their petition to rezone land for a proposed housing
project was arbitrary and was designed to perpetuate existing racial
segregation in Evanston, Illinois. The court specifically dealt with the
standing of each plaintiff.78 First, the court held that the Sisters, owner of
75. See 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 944, 955 (1975). For example, in Sisters of Providence of St.
Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1971) the court
granted potential residents standing with this statement: "The interests of the individuals
in this case are... not so remote as to deny them standing."
76. 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. I11. 1971).
77. Plaintiffs included: Sisters of Providence, owner of the tract in question; Interaction,
Inc., a corporation dedicated to providing better housing for low- and moderate-income
families which sought to purchase the Sisters' property if a higher density zone could be
obtained; Evanston Neighbors at Work, a nonprofit corporation that sought to organize
low- and moderate-income housing; Evanston Housing Center, a corporation similar to
Neighbors; and individual plaintiffs who lived in substandard housing and who were
prospective tenants of the proposed development. Id. at 398.
78. Cf. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). There the court held that city officials had willfullv
deprived low-income blacks of their housing rights under the fourteenth amendment. The
court did not consider whether standing existed for the remaining plaintiffs - a civil
rights organization, potential residents, and the Buffalo Diocese but simply found that the
Association (developer) had proved a "high stake in the litigation which it ha[d] instituted
in order to provide the blacks in Lackawanna with sufficient facilities." Id. at 112.
Evidence of racial discrimination was abundant. A man-made and city-approved physical
barrier actually segregating the black community from the rest of the city existed in
Lackawanna. The city was divided into three wards. The first ward, where 98.9% of the
city's nonwhite residents lived, had the worst housing, highest density, highest crime rate
and worst air pollution. Railroad tracks, with a single bridge for connection, separated the
first ward from the rest of the city. Nonwhites comprised one-tenth of the city's total
population but 35.4% of the first ward's population. No resident of the first ward was a
member of the all-white planning and development board and only one first ward resident
was on the city council. The city's three housing projects were all located in the first ward,
and for a long time the best one was restricted to whites. Finally, although many blacks
sought to move out of the first ward, no contractor would build suitable housing in the
third ward. 436 F.2d at 110. Plaintiffs' plan to build a low-income housing project in the
third ward caused vigorous opposition, including the institution of this suit. Likewise in
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970), the court recognized that the effect of a referendum which prevented the
construction of a low-income housing project was to deny decent housing and an
integrated environment to low-income residents of Union City. Id. at 295-96. Potential
residents and an organization which promoted housing for Spanish-speaking residents of
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the tract of land, had a personal stake in the outcome and that the
arbitrary denial of rezoning violated their property rights under the
fourteenth amendment. Curiously, the court noted that the Sisters
themselves might not be directly affected "in terms of racial discrimina-
tion" by the city's refusal to rezone.79 To the court, however, the fact that
the Sisters had not been directly affected by the rezoning denial in terms
of racial discrimination was not determinative of their right to bring
suit.s0 A second plaintiff, Interaction, also had an interest in the land in
question as prospective vendee.8 t In addition, it had completed
sufficient preliminary work in planning the project to insure a requisite
"personal stake" in the litigation. The court added that Interaction also
was suing on behalf of the individuals who would be denied housing if
the property were not rezoned, declaring that "[t]his alone would be
sufficient for standing. '82
Sisters of Providence is typical of the federal courts' less rigorous
approach to the standing doctrine when plaintiffs allege injury due to
an ordinance's serious racial impact. Thus, in Dailey v. City of Lawton83
the court also granted a developer, whose civil rights had not been
impinged, standing to assert the rights of a potential resident who had
no interest in the land affected by the zoning decision.84 By implication
the county were implicitly afforded standing, since the issue was not raised in the case.
79. 335 F. Supp. at 400.
80. Id.
81. Interaction was formed to purchase the Evanston tract for low-income housing. In a
fcderal court and under the traditional zoning approach of the state court, a vendee under a
conditional sales contract is deemed to have a sufficient interest in the property to confer
standing. In jurisdictions applying more stringent standing requirements he has standing
if joined with the vendor in a suit to appeal the denial of a petition to rezone. See 3
ANDFRSON, supra note 2, § 21.07; Note, Standing to Appeal Zoning Determinations, supra
note 17, at 1074-77; Comment, The "Aggrieved Person" Requzrement in Zoning, supra
note 17, at 297-300.
82.335 F. Supp. at 401. The two community organizations, Neighbors and Center, were
granted standing under the same rationale. Id.
83. 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). In Dailey a dveloper sponsoring a low-income
housing project in a predominately white section of the city was joined by a potential black
ienter of project space. Plaintiffs sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1891,42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). alleging that their fourteenth amendment rights had been denied by the city's
rcfusal to issue a building permit or make a zoning change.
81. But set, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976). In Petaluma the court was faced with deciding the
standing of a homebuilders association and individual landowners challenging the city of
Petaluma's recently enacted five-year housing and zoning plan. The city, alarmed by its
accelerated growth, adopted a land use plan which amounted to a "population cap"
sheltering the city from in-migration. The plan called for a housing development growth
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then, the potential renter was afforded standing along with the
developer "It was enough for the complaining parties to show that the
local officials [were] effectuating the discriminatory design of private
individuals." 85 While the potential renter had been subjected to racial
discrimination,8 6 it is unclear what civil rights of the developer were
denied.
Sisters of Providence and Dailey87 illustrate the possibility of a
rate not to exceed 500 dwelling units per year. Each dwelling unit represented three people.
The 500 unit figure was somewhat misleading, however, because it applied only to
housing units that were part of projects involving five units or more. Thus, the 500-unit
figure did not reflect any housing and population growth due to construction of single-
family homes or even four-unit apartment buildings not part of a largerproject. The plan
also included a 200-foot wide "green belt" around the city to serve asa boundary for urban
expansion. Plaintiffs challenged the city's growth plan, alleging that it violated their
constitutional "right to travel." The city challenged the standing of the landowners and
the association to maintain the suit. The Ninth Circuit applied the Data Processing tests
and refused plaintiffs standing to assert the right to travel claim. The court found
plaintiffs' claim to be asserted not on their own behalf, but on the behalf of a group of
unknown third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petaluma. Accordingly, the
court, citing Warth, ruled that the plaintiffs' right to travel claim fell "squarely within the
prudential standing rule that normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal
interests of others to obtain relief from injuries to themselves." Id. at 905. Plaintiffs were,
however, afforded standing to maintain their action on alleged due process violations.
Petaluma may have some import for several reasons. It implies that the "right to travel"
may be a legitimate basis for challenging an exclusionary ordinance, if brought by a
proper party. The court declared that this right would be a proper allegation to be asserted
by those "whose mobility is impaired." Id. at 904. At first glance, this would seem to
indicate that potential residents of an area excluded by zoning ordinancescould challenge
them on the basis of a deprivation of their right to travel, enter, and live within the
exclusionary area. But Petaluma does not go so far it specifically endorses lWarth. The
court's final remarks, concluding the discussion of the "right to travel" claim, casts doubt
upon what would seem to have encouraged the potential resident challenger. The court,
however, left open the federal court door for plaintiffs who have some interest in a
particular housing project and who, but for the restrictive zoning ordinance, would be able
to reside in the community. Id. at 905.
But Petaluma, despite its apparent endorsement of a novel claim in the zoning field-
the right to travel - offers little more opportunity to potential resident challengers than
does Warth. In fact, Petaluma, if interpreted broadly, is even more restrictive than Warth.
After Petaluma, a developer may no longer be able to allege a violation of the civil rights of
a potential resident of his housing project unless he, himself, personally suffers similar
deprivations. This casts doubt on the views expressed by the courts in both Dailey and
Sisters of Providence, where developers were indeed allowed to assert the civil rights and
injuries of potential residents. See Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use
Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564 (1975). Seegenerally Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404
F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Il1. 1975).
85. 425 F.2d at 1039.
86. Id. at 1039-40.
87. See also Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788(5th Cir.
1972), where the court afforded standing to a developer and the potential residents of low-
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successful challenge by potential residents if they are able to make strong
allegations of racial discrimination. In this situation standing becomes
a less important issue, or is sometimes overlooked completely, so that the
court can meet head-on the "real and direct prejudice" of the
exclusionary scheme.88 Given this perspective, Warth may simply be a
case of faulty pleadings. Like Dailey or Sisters of Providence, the
plaintiffs in Warth brought their claims under the fourteenth
amendment and the civil rights acts. Furthermore, the Penfield
ordinance may have been marred by the same purposeful scheme of
direct prejudice as those of the former cases. The principal distinction
alluded to by the Court is that the grievances expressed by the Warth
plaintiffs were primarily economic8 9 rather than racial in nature. If the
potential residents of Penfield had been able to point to a serious racial
impact of the ordinances, the Court probably would have concerned
itself more with correcting social ills, attaching less significance to the
issue of plaintiffs' standing.9 0
B. A Statutory Basis for the Challenge:
The Expanding "Zone of Interests"
As a second alternative to Warth, a potential resident should attempt
to attack an exclusionary ordinance on statutory rather than con-
stitutional claims. This response to the Warth result would attempt to
capitalize on the exercise of the congressional power to grant standing
by statute to persons who would otherwise lack it. 1 Even absent a
and moderate-income housing in Atlanta. The court held that the individual plaintiffs
had standing to challenge the ominous trend in Atlanta toward a black inner city and a
white suburban ring.
88. See note 78 supra.
89. The allegations were primarily of lost wages, commuting expenses, high taxes and
lost development advantages. See notes 47-49,57,72 supra. Only one housing organization
and three of the potential residents alleged racial injury. Metro Act claimed that its
members were "losing the benefits of living in an integrated community." Petitioners'
Brief for Certiorari at 12, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The potential residents
alluded to a denial of their right to live in an integrated environment. Id. at 8-9. See 422
U.S. at 503 : nn.13-16.
90. Particular attention should be paid to the suit recently filed in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by both present and future residents of EasttownTownship. They challenge
the racially discriminatory effect of Easttown's zoning practices and procedures that
operate to deny them equal opportunity in access to housing. Irby v. EasttownTownship,
Civil No. 75-3452 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
91. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 514, citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 212, where Justice White wrote in a concurring opinion:
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particular housing site, a potential resident will be afforded standing if
he can show that "an invasion of a statutory duty had or is likely to
occur." 92 Because the "zone of interests" of several relevant statutes are
today viewed broadly, a potential resident is often held to be within the
protective intent of these statutes. Thus, by bringing a statutory claim
the potential resident may be afforded standing to attack the
exclusionary scheme.93
Recent case law suggests that potential residents will be granted
standing if they seek relief within the statutory confines of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196494 (Title VI) or Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
Absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 would have a great difficulty in concluding that
petitioners' complaint in this case presented a case or controversy within the
jurisdiction of the district court under Article III of the Constitution. But with that
statute purporting to give all those who are authorized to complain to the agency the
right also to sue in court, I would sustain the statute insofar as it extends standing to
those in the position of the petitioners in this case.
92. Evans v. Lynn, P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNiTY IN HoUSING 1 13,712 at 14,534 (2d Cir.
June 2, 1975), citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 n.2 (1974).
93. The Warth Court's approach rejects an earlier decision by a New York district court.
Though that case dealt with a challenge to an administrative ruling by an agency of the
federal government, rather than a zoning ordinance, the focus of the case was on plaintiffs'
desire to obtain adequate low-income housing near a proposed government office
building. The plaintiffs did not reside within the affected area. In Brookhaven Housing
Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), a civic organization and residents
of the town of Brookhaven sought a preliminary injunction against the occupancy by the
IRS and the General Services Administration (GSA) of a new building being constructed
in the town. They complained that adequate housing for low-income and minority groups
was not available in the town and that the GSA should have assured adequate housing
before locating a substantial federal installation in that town. Id. at 1028. The defendants
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert enforcement of an executive order that
would require the GSA to give consideration to the "impact" of the facility on the entire
community. No plaintiff was currently employed at the facility. The court based its grant
of standing on two practical considerations: there was no one else in a position to represent
the prospective employees who would work in the alleged facility; and nonemployees
might be affected by an increased demand for low-income housing, and come within the
ambit of those affected by "the impact [the] selection [would] have on improving social
and economic conditions in the area" within the meaning of the executive order. Id. at
1029. The court concluded that "it was only necessary that plaintiffs be within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated." Data Processing and Norwalk CORE were cited as
controlling. Id. Unlike Warth, the civic organization was not required to allegea "special
circumstance" giving it the right to be a representative of potentially injured members. See
note 36 supra. Secondly, the plaintiffs could allege potential and future injury to
themselves and those whom they sought to represent. This rationale was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Warth which held that the injury must be direct and immediate. 422
U.S. at 514-17.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1970), requires federal agencies affirmatively to
effectuate the Act's anti-discrimination policy in programs receiving federal assistance:
"No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be
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of 196895 (Title VIII). In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.96 the Supreme Court declared that the civil rights acts indicate a
congressional intent to define standing as broadly as is permitted by the
case or controversy requirement of Article III. 97 The Trafficante Court
held that white tenants alleging injury pursuant to section 810(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 have standing to challenge the discriminatory
refusal of the owner to rent to nonwhites.98 The Court stated that the
"definition of 'person aggrieved' "contained in section 810(a) is broad,
as it is defined as "any person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice." 99 The Court concluded that Congress
intended persons in plaintiffs' position - residents of the housing fa-
cilities - to be able to sue as private attorneys general.100
A recent federal decision* has extended this statutory grant of
standing to potential as well as actual residents of a housing project. In
Evans v. Lynn 101 a complaint was brought by minority residents forced
to reside in racially concentrated areas of the county because of the
alleged discriminatory land use practices of the town of New Castle,
New York.02 The complaint stated that in 1969 New Castle decided to
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. § 2000d.
95.42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31(1970), requires similar effectuation of its fair housing practices:
"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." Id. § 3601.
96. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
97. Id.
98. Plaintiffs alleged that as the result of such discrimination they had been injured in
that they had lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community, had missed
business and professional advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with
members of minority groups, and had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in
social, business and professional activities from being "stigmatized" as residents of a white
ghetto. Id. at 208.
99. Id.
100. The Court relied in part on the clear congressional purpose in enacting the 1968
Act:
The dispute tendered by this complaint is presented in an adversary context.. .. The
person on the landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory housing
practices; it is ... the "whole community".., and as Senator Mondale [who drafted
§ 810(a)] said, the reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos by "truly
integrated and balanced living patterns."
Id. at 111.
*Ed. Note: see addendum
101. P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 113,712 (2d Cir. June 2, 1975).
102. The court characterized the town as a predominantly white (98.7%) and well-to-do
enclave, 90% of which is zoned for single-family residential development on parcels more
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install a sanitary sewer system in a section of the town. Thereafter the
town made application to the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) for federal financing of the projects. HUD
was specifically notified that blacks, Spanish-speaking persons, and all
other persons of low-income would be denied the opportunity to benefit
from federal funding of the sewer project because New Castle's housing
and zoning laws prevented the development of low- and moderate-
income housing. Nevertheless, HUD granted $385,000 for the project.
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin HUD from granting the funds,
claiming that such a grant violated Title VI 103 and Title VIII.104
Initially, the Evans court determined that plaintiffs were "arguably
within the zone of interests" protected by the statutes. 05 The court next
held that sewer funds are "housing and development" funds within the
meaning of Title VIII.106 Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs had
been "injured in fact" by the nonenforcement of Title VIII "purely and
simply because one important method of enforcement of the con-
gressional policy set forth in Title VIII by the agencies' administration
of grants related to housing or urban development and not because
plaintiffs have any connection with New Castle or would even try to live
there."107
Evans indicates that when a suit is filed under an applicable statute
courts may be willing to deal with the rights of potential residents
than one acre, with a median value of single-family homes in 1970 in excess of $50,000. The
town had thwarted the New York State Urban Development Corporation's attempt to
construct within its borders a small 100-unit low-cost housing facility and thus in the
words of the court below "continues to be resistant to attempts to alter its present housing
character." Id. at 14,531.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1970).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
105. The issue presented was whether Titles VI and VIII impose a duty on federal
agencies to act on behalf of the county residents to "affirmatively further fair housing" and
to withhold otherwise proper grants if such policies are not complied with. See P-H EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 1 13,712 at 14,532 (2d Cir. June 2, 1975).
106. Id. at 14,533-34. The court relied on dictum from Jones v. Alfred H. MayerCo., 392
U.S. 409,417 (1968), where Justice Stewart wrote, Title VIII at least is a "detailed housing
law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete
arsenal of federal authority."
107. P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 1 13,712 at 14, 535 (2dCir. June 2, 1975).
None of the plaintiffs had been refused the sale or rental of housing in New Castle. Further,
the plaintiffs neither had any interest in land within the town, nor any connection with
plans or proposals to construct housing for them within the town. In this respect,
plaintiffs in Evans were identical to plaintiffs in Warth, leading the Evans court to
distinguish Warth on the basis of the nature of the pleadings. In Evans there was an alleged
violation of a statutory duty; in Warth no such statutory allegation was made. Id. at 14,534.
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complaining of exclusionary zoning and land use policies. Plaintiffs in
Evans sought to obtain their objective - the opening of suburbs to low-
income groups and minorities - not by a frontal attack on New Castle
on the theory of unconstitutional zoning, but indirectly by an oblique
attack on HUD for failing, in making the sewer grant, affirmatively to
promote fair and suitable housing pursuant to Title VIII. Additionally,
plaintiffs asserted that in making the sewer grant HUD "assisted] and
encourag[ed] New Castle in its practices of racial discrimination"' 01 and
denied plaintiffs their right to participate in the receipt of federal
benefits in derogation of Title VI.'0
Another potential source of statutory relief for plaintiffs seeking to
move out of the inner city and into the suburbs is the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (HCDA).1O° Passage of the HCDA
sets the stage for judicial recognition of standing for potential residents
by explicit statutory protections even broader than those recognized in
Evans. The Act articulates a policy of favoring the dispersal of low-
income housing and tying community development grants to housing
assistance plans"' in order to accommodate the needs of those "expected
108. Id. at 14,537. (Moore, C. J., dissenting).
109. Id.; cf. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971); Gautreaux v. Romney,
418 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). In the Gautreaux cases black tenants and applicants for public
housing filed companion cases against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD
claiming that the two agencies had violated statutory (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83) and
contitutional (fourteenth amendment) obligations by discriminatory tenant assignment
and site selection policies and practices. The suit against HUD successfully alleged that
the federal government had assisted CHA in achieving its discriminatory results.
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). Three years later the district court
enterd a remedial order in the cases, by now consolidated, requiring CHA to select sites for
future public housing in predominantly white areas of Chicago. Gautreaux v. Romney,
363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Il1. 1973). But it confined the site selection to the geographical
bounds of the city and required only that HUD use its best efforts to assist CHA. Id. at691.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court order and imposed a metropolitan-wide
plan. Gautreaux v. CHA. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974). The SupremeCourt affirmed. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). For a more thorough discussion of the Gautreaux
litigation see Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation v. Public Housing Desgrega-
lion: The Local School District and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URBAN L. ANN.
115 (1975).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-17 (Supp. IV, 1974).
111. One of Congress' goals is to reduce "the isolation of income groups within
communities and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and
vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities
for persons of lower income." 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6). See City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F.
Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), where the city challenged the surrounding communities' rights
to receive federal funds under the HCDA, unless they complied with the Act's purpose.
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to reside in the community."'" 2 HUD strengthened this notion by
regulations expanding the Act's "zone of interests" to include those
persons "planning or expected to reside in the community as a result of
planned or existing employment facilities."" 3 A central city resident -
potential suburban resident - holding or desiring a suburban job "is
more likely to be injured in fact and is within the zone of interests
established by the statute to complain of CD funding to a locality that
has submitted an inadequate housing assistance plan or has failed to
implement its plan."" 4 The policy of the Act could thus be carried out
by enjoining or limiting federal subsidies to jurisdictions with
exclusionary land use schemes. This action, in turn, would stimulate
low-income housing in those areas. 1 5
While some plaintiffs have capitalized on the advantages of the
statutory approach, the plaintiffs in Warth were not as resourceful. The
Warth plaintiffs very well might have been granted standing on the basis
of a statutory right had they asserted it. 16 Indeed, the majority implies as
The district court permanently enjoined the suburban towns around Hartford from
making HCDA expeditures because of their failure to provide low-income housing, give
feasible priority to activities which would benefit low- and moderate-income families, or
adequately address regional housing needs. The court stated that "[t]he plaintiffs'
allegations, and the statutory language, make it clear that the City falls within the'zone of
interests' created by the Act." Id at 894. Of the potential resident plaintiffs, the court
declared, "As poor persons living in Hartford in substandard hosing, they are certainly
within the 'zone of interests' created by the 1974 Act." Id. at 895.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. IV, 1974).
113.24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2) (1975). The legislative history emphasizes consideration of
those who could be expected to reside there, including present and future employees of
proposed facilities. See H.R. REP. No. 114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1973).
114. Franklin, Open Communities Litigation and the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, in NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING,
EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE LITIGATION POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE 83, 94-95
(1974). See also Kushner, Litigation Strategies and Judicial Review Under Title I of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 37,67-68 & nn. 133-
36 (1976).
115. This remedy is a far more manageable one for federal courts than the reform of local
land use regulatory policy. Generally, the latter remedy has been instituted only by the
state courts. See The Potomac Institute, Inc., Memorandum 75-5, June 30, 1975, at 6.
Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case For
Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 197, 215 & n.107 (1975).
116. The Warth plaintiffs raised only constitutional challenges to the Penfield
ordinances. The amicus brief of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
argued that the individual Warth plaintiffs' allegations did state colorable claims under
Title VIII and that the Penfield members of plaintiff Metro Act were "persons aggrieved"
within § 3610 of Title VIII. Section 3610 refers to § 810 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act which
provides in pertinent part that "Any person who claims that he will be irrevocably injured
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much: "We intimate no view as to whether had the complaint alleged
purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination, Metro Act would have stated
a claim under § 3604."n 7 If Metro Act, one of the nonprofit organizations
concerned with better housing in the Rochester area, had asserted a
claim based on behalf of its low-income members, a cause of action
under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act,11 8 the Warth plaintiffs may well
have been afforded the opportunity to litigate their claims on the merits.
Contrasting this more indirect statutory approach to the direct
constitutional attack in Warth, the proper strategy becomes apparent. A
potential resident, instead of challenging the locality's zoning decisions
directly, should carefully investigate the federally-subsidized develop-
ment opportunities available to the town. By bringing a complaint
against the federal agency responsible for dispensing funds for the
town's housing, social and recreational improvements, he can attack the
town's discriminatory housing practices indirectly. Brought under the
protective auspices of Title VI and Title VIII, or the HCDA, where
standing is an automatic statutory grant, an attack on a federal agency's
violation of its affirmative duty to comply with federal equal housing
opportunity mandates will likely succeed.
C. Bringing Suit in State Court: A Cause of Action
Broad Enough to Protect a Potential Resident
The independent development of both standing and zoning law at the
state and federal levels provides a potential resident challenging an
exclusionary scheme with a third alternative to circumvent the Warth
result: sue in state court." 9 Recent case law at the state level has
necessitated reform of the standing requirements in zoning matters.
This is an indirect outgrowth of the federal courts' traditional
by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur... may file a complaint with
the Secretary." The Warth Court indicated that "It [was] significant [that]... petitioners
nowhere adoptied] this argument." 422 U.S. at 513 n.21.
117. Id. The statute reads in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be unlawful -
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bonafide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
119. See generally Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning
Decisions, supra note 25.
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inclination to leave to the state judiciary review of questions of state
law.1 20 Indeed, the most sympathetic interpretation of the reasons
behind the Warth opinion may be attributed to a recognition of the
federal/state dichotomy.
The Ninth Circuit in another recent federal zoning case, Construction
Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,t21 relied on
the doctrine of "state prerogative" in zoning matters to remove
themselves from what has been called the "remedial thicket.' ' 22 The
Ninth Circuit declared:
If the present system of delegated zoning power does not effectively
serve the state interest in furthering the general welfare of the
region or entire state, it is the state legislature's and not the federal
courts' role to intervene and adjust the system .... [T]he federal
court is not a super zoning board and should not be called on to
mark the point at which legitimate local interests in promoting the
welfare of the community are outweighed by legitimate regional
interests. 23
Thus Warth and Petaluma simply reiterate a time-honored principle of
federalism: that state courts should be the primary reviewers of disputes
involving state laws, including state and local exclusionary zoning
regulations.124
Historically, then, the state court would seem to be the proper
arbitrator of a potential resident's attack on an exclusionary ordinance.
Two additional recent developments make the state court an even more
likely forum for review. The first of these developments is the
willingness of some state courts to examine a single locality's alleged
120. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874). See also Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,174, 336 A.2d 713,725 cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975). ("We reach this conclusion understate law and so do not find it necessary
to consider federal constitutional grounds urged by plaintiffs.").
121. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1148 (1976).
122. The Warth court noted that "zoning laws and their provisions long considered
essential to effective urban planning are peculiarly within the province of state and local
authorities." 422 U..S. at 508 n.18.
123. 522 F.2d at 908. See also Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and
Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585, 608-11 (1974).
124. For example, the Supreme Court, with one exception, has not decided a case on the
use of police power in zoning law since 1928. During the intervening 48 years the state
courts have passed on nearly 10,000 such decisions. See Williams, Doughty & Potter,
Exclusionary Zoning Strategies: Effective Lawsuit Goals & Criteria, in I MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL OF GROWrH 477, 483 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
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exclusionary ordinance in terms of regional needs. The second
development is their willingness to institute affirmative action
programs which order a broad restructuring of the locality's land use
policy. 25 These developments broaden the substantive rights of
potential residents and thereby allow for a concomitant expansion of the
standing requirements in state courts.
While zoning disputes before state courts generally have not focused
on the question of standing, they nevertheless suggest a movement to
recognize the protectible interests of those outside the borders of the
town. In this regard some state courts, particularly in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, have begun to examine zoning practices from a broad
geographical perspective, focusing on regional growth and develop-
ment.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently refused to allow
municipalities to exclude, through various zoning techniques, people
seeking a "comfortable place to live."' 2 6 In Appeal of Girsh127 the court,
recognizing that apartment living is a "fact of life" for which suburban
communities must provide, invalidated a zoning ordinance that
prohibited plaintiffs' proposed apartment development. 28 Subsequent
125. See, e.g., Note, Beyond Invalidation: The Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URBAN L. ANN.
159 (1975).
126. National Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965). In Kohn the
court struck down a four-acre minimum lot size restriction on township land, holding that
the township could not use its zoning to"stand in the way of the natural forces which send
our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place
to live." Id. The court went on to declare that "a zoning ordinance whose primary purpose
is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid further burdens, economic and
otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facilities cannot be held valid."
Id. Here there was no standing problem because the action was brought by a developer who
owned land affected by the exclusionary zoning regulation.
127. 137 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
128. The court stated that perhaps in an ideal world
planning and zoning would be done on a regional basis, so that a given community
would have apartments, while an adjoining community would not. But as long as we
allow zoning to be done community by community, it is intolerable to allow one
municipality... to close its doors at the expense of surrounding communities and
the central city.
Id. at 245 n.4, 263 A.2d at 399 n.4.
The Pennsylvania court later applied the same rationale in Township of Willistown v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. -. , 341 A.2d 466 (1975). Here plaintiff was seeking a
building permit to complete an apartment complex as planned. The ordinance failed to
provide for any apartment development in the area of plaintiff's land. The court held the
ordinance unconstitutional, concluding that the township had failed to assume its "fair
share" of the regional burden to meet housing shortage as required by Girsh.
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Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly held that exclusionary zoning is
unconstitutional, insisting that one locality has no right to decide who
may or may not live within its confines, while disregarding the interests
of the surrounding area.129
In orly one of these Pennsylvania cases, however, has standing been
directly at issue. In Commonwealth v. Bucks County' 30 minority and
low-income residents of Bucks County sued to invalidate the ex-
clusionary zoning practices of defendant and all its municipalities. The
court affirmed the holding of the lower court that any relief would be
premature and merely advisory because plaintiffs had no present interest
in a particular parcel of land and had not applied for building
permits.13' The Bucks court's denial of standing is in line with the
Supreme Court decision in Warth. At the same time, however, the case
appears to be in direct conflict with the underlying rationale of the
majority of Pennsylvania cases. Their overriding concern with regional
welfare would seem to suggest that a potential resident of a town, already
a resident of the "region" should be afforded standing to challenge an
ordinance as violating the region's welfare as well as his own individual,
social, educational and housing rights. The rationale behind this view is
simple: since the courts now admit that social and economic injury is
not confined by political lines, there is no reason why judicial review
should be confined by political lines. 32 The Bucks decision may thus be
best explained as a failure to follow the trend toward an awakening
sensitivity to the relationship between zoning practices and a wide range
of contemporary social, economic, environmental and racial problems.
The New Jersey courts have also begun to incorporate an expanded
concept of regional welfare into their decisions dealing with the validity
of local zoning ordinances. 3 3 In a recent decision the New Jersey
129. See, e.g., Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) in which the
court declared, "a scheme of zoning that has an exclusionary purpose or effect is not
acceptable in Pennsylvania." Id. at 470, 268 A.2d at 766.
130. 8 Pa. Commw. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
131. Id. at 295, 302 A.2d at 902.
132. See Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DICK.
L. REv. 634, 651 (1970); 25 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 760 (1974).
133. The most extensive consideration of regional housing needs in an exclusionary
zoning context in New Jersey is provided in Oakwood at Madison Township, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,283 A.2d353 (L. Div. 1971), on remand, 128 N.J.
Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974). See Furman (authorof original trial court opinion
and final case on appeal), Regional Housing Needs: Oakwood at Madison, in I
MANAGEMENT 8C CoNTROL OF GROWTH, 499 (R. Scott ed. 1975). See also Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713 (1975)
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Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance that restricted lot sizes
of multi-family structures in order to maintain "an elite community of
high-income families with few children."'31 4 State constitutional and
statutory provisions, however, provide the foundation for the regional
approach that New Jersey courts are beginning to take to both standing
and zoning law. 135 This approach becomes even more apparent when
examining a recent decision by the New Jersey court which may predict
the future posture of the state judiciary in zoning matters. Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel 36 illustrates the
developing willingness of the New Jersey Court to institute affirmative
action programs calling for broad restructuring of an entire region's
land use policy and suggests why a potential resident has a greater
likelihood of being granted standing in a state rather than a federal
court.
In Mt. Laurel plaintiffs attacked the township's exclusionary system
of land use regulation on the ground that low- and moderate-income
families were unlawfully excluded. The plaintiffs fell into four
categories: (1) present residents of the township residing in dilapidated
and substandard housing; (2) former residents who were forced to move
elsewhere because of the absence of suitable housing; (3) nonresidents
living in substandard central city housing in the region who desired to
secure decent housing elsewhere within their means; and (4) three
organizations representing the housing and other interests of racial
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Desimonev.Greater Englewood HousingCorp. No. 1,56
N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31(1970). But see Vickersv. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 932,181 A.2d 129
(1962).
134. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. at 446, 320
A.2d at 227. Plaintiffs were composed of two groups: two developers who owned vacant
land in Madison Township, and a class of low-income individuals who resided outside
Madison Township by reason of the newly adopted zoning restrictions.
135. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp. 1975), which provides:
[A]ny person, whether residing within or without the municipality whose right to
use, acquire, or enjoy property is or may be affected by an action under the act to
which this act is a supplement, or whose rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property
under any other law of this state or the United States has been denied, violated, or
infringed by an action or a failure to act... may bring suit under the New Jersey
zoning provisions.
(emphasis added). Additionally, other legislation in Massachusetts, Alabama and New
York puts an end to land use planning which remains unconcerned with the regional
needs of potential residents. See, e.g., Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary
Zoning, supra note 4, at 54-58.
136. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), aff'g 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div.
1972).
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minorities. The township initially challenged plaintiffs' standing to
bring the action on appeal. The court dismissed the defendants' charge
stating that the resident plaintiffs and both categories of nonresidents
had standing to sue. 3 7 The court then found that over the years Mt.
Laurel "'ha[d] acted affirmatively to control development and to attract
a selective type of growth' "138 and that through its zoning ordinance
"exhibited economic discrimination in that the poor were deprived of
adequate housing and the opportunity to secure 'construction of
subsidized housing.' ",139 The court directed itself to the same issues that
later arose in Warth: whether potential residents can challenge a system
of land use regulation that makes it physically and economically
impossible for them to buy or rent low- and moderate-income housing
in the municipality, and whether a township can exclude such persons
from living within its confines because of the limited extent of their
income and resources. 40 The New Jersey court concluded that as a
matter of substantive state law every municipality must accept its fair
share of regional housing needs within its boundaries.' 4' The court then
focused the remainder of its opinion on the nature of the remedy for the
exclusionary wrong. The remedy called for by the court was a reform of
local land use controls, with the court intervening only if the township
failed to perform as directed. 42
The dissimilar treatment of exclusionary zoning disputes in the state
and federal courts explains the dichotomy of treatment received by the
plaintiffs in Warth and Mt. Laurel. In Warth plaintiffs with claims
identical to those in Mt. Laurel were refused standing.'4 The most
sympathetic interpretation of Warth may be the Supreme Court's
137. Id. at 159 n.3, 336 A.2d at 717 n.3.
138. Id. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723. Under the ordinance, 29.2% of the township land was
zoned for industry. The balance of the land area was divided into four residential districts.
All permitted only single-family detached housing-one house per lot. Attached
townhouses, apartments and mobile homes were not allowed anywhere in the township
under the general ordinance. Id. at 162-63, 336 A.2d at 719. The general effect of the
ordinance requirements was to raise the price of access beyond the financial reach of
potential low-income residents.
139. Id. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723.
140. Id. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
141. Id. at 188-91, 336 A.2d at 732-34.
142. Id. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734.
143. In Mt. Laurel, as in Warth, plaintiffs were potential residents who sought the
economic, cultural and social advantages of suburban living. Compare notes 47-48, 57 and
accompanying text supra, with text following note 136 supra. But in Mt. Laurel unlike
Warth, the court did find their allegations sufficient to show injury. 67 N.J. at 159 & n.3,
336 A.2d at 717 & n.3.
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ALTERNATIVES TO WARTH v. SELDIN
reluctance to engage in judicial activism to surmount federal/state and
judicial/legislative prerogatives.1 44 Contrary to the Mt. Laurel court, the
Warth court refused to enter the "remedial thicket" and may have denied
plaintiffs standing primarily on the basis of the type of relief sought. In
Warth the Court sought to limit federal court intervention to situations
in which an order directing a locality to permit a specific project to go
forward is the appropriate relief. 45 Such relief is more manageable, the
Court felt, and restricts federal intrusion into what ought to be a state or
local prerogative. 46
At the same time, Mt. Laurel may be proof of the soundness of the
Warth Court's rationale. It illustrates both the state court's superior
perception of the local situation and its understanding of how planning
jargon is used to cover prejudice. In addition, Mt. Laurel also indicates
that the state courts, more than the federal courts, have the ability to
supervise a major restructuring of land use policy.
Nevertheless, a critical distinction between Warth and Mt. Laurel
remains the basis of each court's decisionmaking process. Warth
involved a claim for relief on federal constitutional grounds. Mt. Laurel,
on the other hand, involved interpretation of broad state statutory and
constitutional provisions. 47 The independent development of both
standing and zoning law at the state and federal levels becomes clearest at
this point. At the state level the potential for reform of zoning and
standing law rests initially with the state legislature. The Mt. Laurel
court confined itself to analysis of specific New Jersey statutory and
constitutional mandates. Standing for nonresidents was afforded on the
basis of a New Jersey statute granting standing to all persons "within
and without" the municipality whose right "to use, acquire, or enjoy
property is or may be affected. '148 The ordinance was invalidated for
contravening a constitutional provision that required a zoning
regulation to promote the "general welfare."'149 General welfare was
144. See The Potomac Institute, Inc., Memorandum 75-5, June 30, 1975, at 3.
145. 422 U.S. at 516.
146. Id. at 508 n.18.
147. Standing was granted to nonresidents by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp. 1975);
see note 135 supra. The regional welfare rationale was an interpretation of the
constitutional provision providing that zoning regulations in New Jersey were to promote
the general welfare. 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725.
148. See note 135 supra. It has been suggested that the statute may have been unwittingly
passed without consideration of its potential effect. N.Y.Times, Jan. 25,1970, § 8, at 9, col.
1.
149. See note 147 supra.
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found to extend the zone of protected interest to all of the state's citizens,
including those beyond the borders of Mt. Laurel.1 50 After Mt. Laurel
one realizes that despite the broad substantive rights recognized by state
courts in zoning matters, any real change in judicial treatment of the
standing and exclusionary zoning problems at the state level must be
undertaken in the state legislatures. Thus, in the last analysis, liberalized
standing requirements in state zoning litigation will result not from
judicial activism but from legislative initiative.15'
CONCLUSION
In light of recent federal and state cases, a potential resident may
indeed be afforded standing to challenge an exclusionary scheme. His
likelihood of success will principally depend on the forum he chooses
and how carefully he drafts his pleadings. The initial decision is
whether to proceed in state or federal court. Should the federal forum be
chosen, the potential resident must take great care in deciding whether
to allege constitutional or statutory violations. If the potential resident
can allege a discriminatory racial purpose or effect he will likely be
granted standing to challenge the 'ordinance under the fourteenth
amendment. Absent such a clear racial impact, the potential resident
should plead a violation of his right to equal housing opportunity
under one of the civil rights acts or the HCDA. In some instances,
though, it may be wise to bring the action in state rather than federal
court. Some states have statutory and constitutional provisions that have
laid a framework for broad regional land use regulation. 52 A potential
resident residing in one of those states may be granted standing to
challenge regulations which he feels are unlawfully exclusionary. This
is especially true if the particular state court is willing to order
affirmative action housing/land use programs. Thus, with intelligent
forum selection and proper pleadings the potential resident may be able
to circumvent the traditional requirement which limits standing to
those with a specific property interest in the land affected.
150. 67 N.J. at 158, 177, 336 A.2d at 716, 726.
151. Warth reiterated this view when it said. "[Citizens dissatisfied with provisions of
such laws need not overlook the availability of the normal democratic process." 422 U.S. at
508 n.18.
152. See generally Hearings on H.R. 3510 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 7 (1975).
[Vol. 11:223
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/8
ADDENDUM
As this volume was being printed, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed Evans v. Lynn, sub noam.
Evans v. Hills, -F.2d -(2d Cir. June 4, 1976) (6-4) (see text at notes
101-09 supra). Relying extensively on Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975), the court held that potential resident challengers failed to meet
the standing requirement of injury in fact.
The decision reflects the reluctance of federal courts to extend
standing to the potential resident challenging exclusionary zoning
schemes under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 orTitle VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 and indicates that if the potential resident
challenger is unable to demonstrate a clear racially discriminatory
purpose or effect, his challenge must be based upon federal statutes
which explicitly grant standing. The decision should not, however,
effect challenges in state court based on state statutes or state
constitutional provisions.
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